After confronting some of the historical arguments made by the court in Andrews, the paper analyzes the recurring attempts to extend judicial review of contractual payments by creating "hybrid stipulations" -payments that are neither payable on breach nor in return for contractual performance. A difficult theoretical exercise awaits: should we create artificial divisions between contractual payments to establish whether they can be reviewed? Or should we finally acknowledge that all sums payable under a contract are part of the commercial bargain? On one hand, doctrinal integrity may point towards the need to vigorously defend the present form of the rule against penalties, including its (seemingly) strict limitation to sums payable on breach. On the other, some arguments made in Andrews and in other recent cases highlight the theoretical inconsistencies of its current formulation. After all, the "breach/no breach" dichotomy can also be regarded as a device for avoiding judicial scrutiny. At present, on the basis of Andrews alone it appears incorrect to use an institution that prohibits deterrence from breach to review the commercial substance of contracts. The rule against penalties reflects the general equitable principle not to enforce oppressive or unconscionable transactions. It does not reform commercially imprudent transactions. Given its exceptional nature, the penalty jurisdiction should be exercised sparingly -even with regards to sums payable on breach. Once sums payable on breach are regarded as part of commercial bargain, it is more difficult to subject them to review. If, however, payment is unrelated to the breach of a contractual promise, it comes dangerously close to being a contractual promise. Any review seems unacceptable.
